顶刊论文流

Chuang Wan, Hengzhao Hong, Wei Zhong, Changliang Zou, Runze Li

Chenchen Ma, Yundong Tu

Todd E. Clark, Florian Huber, Gary Koop

Yang Ni

Ting Fung Ma

Michalis K. Titsias, Angelos Alexopoulos, Siran Liu, Petros Dellaportas

Yuan Liao, Viktor Todorov

Yifan Gu, Hanfang Yang, Songshan Yang, Hui Zou

Kyle Schindl, Zach Branson

Chiara G. Magnani, Matteo Sesia, Aldo Solari

Aritra Halder, Didong Li, Sudipto Banerjee

M. Franchi, I. Georgiev, P. Paruolo

Anupreet Porwal, Abel Rodriguez

Cong Cheng, Runze Li, Yuan Ke

Xuefei Wang, Junhui Wang, Gaorong Li

Yuzheng Dun, Nilanjan Chatterjee, Jin Jin, Akihiko Nishimura

Nigar Hashimzade, Oleg Kirsanov, Tatiana Kirsanova, Junior Maih

Javier Hualde, Jose Olmo

Haoyu Yang, Yichen Qin, Yan Yu, Yang Li

Heng Zhang, Zhi-Ping Liu

Tianxi Cai, Feiqing Huang, Ryumei Nakada, Linjun Zhang, Doudou Zhou

Zeyu Yao, Wenguang Sun, Bowen Gang

Guenther Walther, Qian Zhao

Yong Chen, Yiwen Lu, Jing-Mei Qiu, Huiyuan Wang, Yudong Wang

Yi Zhang, Wenfu Xu, Zhiqiang Tan

Jiawen Chen, Caiwei Xiong, Quan Sun, Yutong Song, Geoffery W. Wang, Gaorav P. Gupta, Aritra Halder, Yun Li, Didong Li

Jad Beyhum, Jonas Striaukas

Abstract We explore the mechanics of empathy. We show that information about an outgroup can activate and magnify empathy when presented in conjunction with an experience simulating their struggles. This response increases the willingness to help the struggling group. We provide evidence for this effect in an immersive virtual reality experiment where participants (“witnesses”) experience a simulation of the struggle of unauthorized migrants (“protagonists”), then replicate these results in a series of controlled lab experiments. We show that information enhances the witnesses’ empathetic response and drives them to engage in more prosocial behavior when it increases their perceived interpersonal similarity, or relatability to the protagonist — an effect we trace to attention: eye-tracking data reveals that information provision concentrates witnesses’ gaze on the struggles of the protagonist instead of searching through peripheral elements of the scene. Conversely, only information packages that strengthen perceived relatability — an effect that can vary across subgroups with heterogeneous attributes — magnify empathy. Together, our evidence suggests that the ability to put oneself in the shoes of another person or group can be enhanced by activating empathy through simple, targeted, information provision.

Peikai Wu, Zhiguo Xiao

Abstract This article uses labor force surveys from 160 countries to build a new microdatabase on hours worked covering 97% of the world population in cross section. We also construct time series spanning over 20 years in 86 countries. Hours worked per adult slightly decline with GDP per capita but are weakly correlated with development overall. Hours worked by the young (aged 15–19) and elderly (aged 60+) fall with development, driven entirely by growing school attendance and public pension coverage. Hours worked among prime-age adults (aged 20–59) are stable with development but undergo a great gender reshuffling: falling hours per male worker have been exactly offset by increases in female labor force participation in many countries. Labor income taxes are strongly negatively related to hours worked across countries. This correlation is attenuated when controlling for social spending and disappears when further controlling for working hours regulations. Both social spending and working hours regulations are associated with lower hours worked.

Minyuan Zhang, Liangjun Su

Chenlei Leng, Degui Li, Han Lin Shang, Yingcun Xia

Yumeng Cui, Yongmiao Hong, Naijing Huang, Yicheng Wang

I study how firm market power and worker bargaining power shape wages and welfare. Using French micro-data, I document patterns linking wages and firm market power that existing models cannot explain. A model in which firms produce vertically differentiated goods and share profits with workers explains those patterns. The model (i) reveals new challenges in estimating monopsony and bargaining power, proposing an alternative approach; (ii) shows that the passthrough of firm-specific shocks to wages depends on the type of shock; (iii) explains how markups shape firm wage premia; and (iv) formalizes how strengthening worker bargaining power affects wages and welfare. (JEL D22, J31, J42, J52, L12, L22)

Preschool-aged children get sick frequently and spread disease to other family members. Despite the universality of this experience, there is limited causal evidence on the magnitudes and consequences of these externalities, especially for infant siblings with developing immune systems and brains. We show in Danish administrative data that during infancy, younger siblings have two to three times higher hospitalization rates for respiratory conditions than older siblings. We combine birth order and within-municipality variation in respiratory disease prevalence among young children, finding lasting differential impacts of early-life respiratory disease exposure on younger siblings' earnings, educational attainment, chronic respiratory health, and mental health-related outcomes. (JEL D13, D62, I12, J12, J13, J24, J31)

We use firm-level data to document that private businesses experience large fluctuations in their profit shares. These are due to large, fat-tailed, and transitory changes in output that are not fully accompanied by changes in their inputs. We interpret this evidence using a model of entrepreneurial dynamics. Because firms can limit their exposure to risk by operating at a smaller scale, our model predicts large macroeconomic losses from uninsurable business risk, much larger than those stemming from credit constraints. While self-financing allows entrepreneurs to quickly overcome credit constraints, even wealthy entrepreneurs remain considerably exposed to risk. (JEL D33, E02, E44, G32, L25, L26)

We show that, depending on how the impact of omitted variables is measured, it can be substantially easier for omitted variables to flip coefficient signs than to drive them to zero. This behavior occurs with “Oster's delta” (Oster 2019a), a widely reported robustness measure. Consequently, any time this measure is large—suggesting omitted variables may be unimportant—a much smaller value reverses the sign of the parameter of interest. We propose a modified measure of robustness to address this concern. We illustrate our results in four empirical applications and two meta-analyses. We implement our methods in the companion Stata module “regsensitivity.” (JEL C18, C21, C52)

Moretti (2021) reports a positive elasticity between technology cluster size and patenting, and uses an event study and instrumental variables regressions to justify a causal interpretation. The event study does not use the variation generated by inventors moving across cities, and the instrument is constructed incorrectly due to a coding error. I run a corrected event study and fix the coding error, and find null effects. The reported elasticity may not be causal. (JEL J24, L60, O31, O34, R32)

What is the optimal response of a resource exporter when a price cap is imposed on its main export? This paper develops a dynamic framework incorporating stochastic prices, financial frictions, and market power to study this novel tool of statecraft. With the right design, a price cap can incentivize increased extraction, stabilizing prices in the global market. But the stabilizing effects diminish when there is leakage outside the cap. Consequently, weak enforcement of the policy worsens the trade-off faced by the sanctioning policymaker. We provide a systematic approach to setting and enforcing an optimal cap level in these circumstances. (JEL F12, F14, F51, L71, P28, P33, Q35)

We show that in heterogeneous agent New Keynesian (HANK) economies with countercyclical risk, the natural interest rate is endogenous and co-moves with output, leaving the economy susceptible to self-fulfilling fluctuations. Unlike in representative agent New Keynesian models, the Taylor principle is not sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of equilibrium in HANK if risk is even mildly countercyclical: Multiple bounded equilibria exist, no matter how strongly monetary policy responds to changes in inflation. For an active monetary policy to eliminate self-fulfilling fluctuations, it must stabilize the endogenous natural rate fluctuations. Alternatively, a passive monetary and active fiscal regime can also eliminate equilibrium multiplicity. (JEL E12, E23, E31, E32, E43, E52, E62)

The implementation of evidence-based policies hinges on the dissemination of evidence to policymakers, a process influenced by the attributes of the sender. We conducted a nationwide RCT with ideologically opposite think tanks, major newspapers, and a research institution with nonsalient ideology to communicate a nonideological, cost-effective policy to local policymakers. Results show a 65 percent increase in policy adoption when informing institutions align ideologically with policymakers. We compare the impact of think tanks versus media outlets on implementation, finding both equally effective when ideologically aligned. We explore three actions where ideology may influence adoption: information exposure, belief updating and implementation. (JEL C93, D72, D78, D83, I23)

We study the welfare impacts of 96 climate-related tax and spending policies. We extend and apply the marginal value of public funds (MVPF) framework, most notably providing a new method for incorporating learning-by-doing spillovers. We find subsidies for the production of clean energy (such as wind production tax credits) have higher MVPFs than all other subsidies in our sample, including EV subsidies. Conservation nudges have large MVPFs when targeting regions with dirty grids. Fuel taxes and cap-and-trade policies are highly efficient means of raising revenue. We also construct traditional cost-per-ton estimates and compare and contrast the lessons they provide. (JEL D83, H23, H25, L62, Q42, Q54, Q58)

This paper studies the implications of central bank credibility for long-run inflation and inflation dynamics. We introduce central bank lack of commitment into a standard nonlinear New Keynesian economy with sticky-price monopolistically competitive firms. Inflation is driven by the interaction of lack of commitment and the economic environment. We show that long-run inflation increases following an unanticipated permanent increase in the labor wedge or decrease in the elasticity of substitution across varieties. In the transition, inflation overshoots and then gradually declines. Quantitatively, inflation overshooting is persistent, and the welfare loss from lack of commitment relative to inflation targeting is large. (JEL D43, E12, E23, E24, E31, E52, E58)

Philippe Aghion

Lack of market transparency can impair the liquidity provision of nonstandard liquidity suppliers and make liquidity demand increasing in illiquidity. This can yield strategic complementarities and induce multiple equilibria. Then an initial dearth of liquidity may degenerate into a liquidity rout (as in a “flash crash”), and traders faced with the largest cost of trading are those trading more intensely at equilibrium. An increase in order flow transparency and/or in the mass of dealers who are in the market at all times has a positive impact on total welfare. (JEL G12, G14, G41)

Peter Howitt

Joel Mokyr

Abstract If unions raise worker wages, who pays? We provide a comprehensive assessment of firm responses to increased unionization, using changes in the tax deductibility of union dues in Norway as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in firm-level union density. In the average private sector firm, higher union density raises labor costs and leads firms to contract employment and production, lowering profits without increasing the labor share. The incidence is shared: consumers bear part of the cost through higher prices, shareholders through lower profits, and the remainder is offset by productivity improvements. The total wage bill falls, with losses concentrated among less-attached “outsider” workers. Firm responses vary systematically by the degree of market competition. In manufacturing, where firms operate in less competitive product and labor markets, the response is reversed: the average firm expands employment and production, reduces labor markdowns, and does not experience profit declines. Instead, higher labor costs are largely passed on to consumers through higher prices, with the remainder offset by productivity gains. Workers benefit as both wages and employment rise. These patterns suggest that unions can offset employer monopsony power and that firm responses–and therefore who ultimately bears the cost-depend importantly on market structure. Overall, unionization in this setting primarily redistributes from consumers rather than shareholders and has effects that differ sharply across firms, including a reallocation toward larger and more productive firms. We rationalize these patterns using a partial-equilibrium model of union bargaining with product- and labor-market power.

Diego Daruich

Miguel Espinosa, Christopher Stanton

Bård Harstad, Katinka Holtsmark

Sebastian Di Tella, Benjamin Hébert, Pablo Kurlat, Qitong Wang

Nikolai Cook, Thibaut Duprey, Anthony Heyes, Martino Pelli

Juliana Londoño-Vélez, Catherine Rodríguez, Fabio Sánchez, Luis Esteban Álvarez-Arango

Jason Abaluck, Giovanni Compiani, Fan Zhang

Rosnel Sessinou

JunYi Peng-Zhou, Xiaojun Song

Markus Bibinger, Jun Yu, Chen Zhang

Yu-Chin Hsu, Martin Huber, Yu-Min Yen

Yu-Wei Luke Chu, Lorena Di Bono

Shin Kanaya, Luke Taylor

Abstract We test for stereotyping—the exaggeration of representative traits—in a high-stakes economic environment. Using surveys administered among undergraduates at the Ohio State University as well as large-scale nationally representative data, we measure how U.S. first-year students perceive the relationship between college majors and occupations. We show that students greatly overestimate the likelihood that majors lead to their representative jobs (e.g., counselor for psychology, journalist for journalism). Using an implicit association test, we show that students associate majors with their representative careers and that these associations strongly predict belief biases, in line with a stereotyping mechanism. A simple equilibrium model of the labor market predicts that stereotyping reduces welfare by increasing misallocation, which we corroborate with correlational evidence on job/major mismatch. In a field experiment, we test a light-touch policy to reduce stereotyping and find significant effects on students’ intentions about what to study as well as the classes and majors they enroll in.

Fengyang He, Huixia Judy Wang

Lupe S. H. Chan, Amanda M. Y. Chu, Mike K. P. So

Abstract We study how people’s beliefs about the economy covary with household-level events, utilizing a unique link between Danish administrative data and a large-scale survey of consumer expectations. We find that compared to actual inflation, people’s inflation forecasts covary much more strongly (and negatively) with both recently realized household income changes and measures of expected future household income changes. We formally establish that these findings are stark deviations from the Bayesian rational expectations benchmark. Similar results hold for perceptions of past inflation (“backcasts” ), suggesting that imperfect recall is a key mechanism for biased forecasts. Building on this, a series of additional tests, some of which utilize data on adverse health events, suggests that the forecast biases are at least partly due to affect-cued recall. That is, negative (positive) household-level events cue negative (positive) recollections, which lead to pessimistic (optimistic) forecasts.

Duncan Webb

David A. Green, Ben M. Sand, Iain G. Snoddy, Jeanne Tschopp

Johnny Tang

Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru

Thomas R Covert, Ryan Kellogg

Ian Schofield Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel

Michela Maria Tincani

Daron Acemoglu, Daniel Huttenlocher, Asuman Ozdaglar, James Siderius

Abstract We present a theory of choice in which attention to the features of options is determined by the decision maker’s categorization of the current problem in a set of problems she solved in the past. Categorization depends on goal-relevant and contextual problem-level features. The model yields heterogeneity in attention and choice in a given problem based on different past experiences and instability when changes in irrelevant context cause recategorization. We show that heterogeneous and unstable representations of a choice problem unify major biases in judgment and decision making.

Kelli Marquardt

Tan Gan, Nicholas Wu

We evaluate equity-efficiency trade-offs from admissions quotas by examining effects on output once beneficiaries start producing in the relevant industry. We estimate the impact of abolishing a 40 percent quota for male primary school teachers on their pupils’ long-run outcomes. We combine this reform with the timing of union-bargained teacher retirements to isolate quasi-random variation in male quota teachers. Pupils exposed to male quota teachers transition more smoothly to postcompulsory education and have higher educational attainment and labor force attachment at age 25. Evidence suggests the quota improved the allocation of talent by mending imperfections in the unconstrained selection process. (JEL I21, I23, I28, J16, J24, J45)

Do elite colleges help talented students join the social elite or help incumbent elites retain their positions? We combine intergenerationally linked data from Chile with a regression discontinuity design to show that, looking across generations, elite colleges do both. Lower-status individuals who gain admission to elite college programs transform their children’s social environment. Children become more likely to attend high-status private schools and colleges and to live near and befriend high-status peers. In contrast, academic achievement is unaffected. Simulations combining descriptive and quasi-experimental findings show that elite colleges tighten the link between social and human capital while decreasing intergenerational social mobility. (JEL I23, I26, J24, J62, O15, Z13)

Policy choices often create trade-offs between workers and consumers. I examine how foreign competition alters the consumer welfare and domestic employment effects of mergers. I construct a model incorporating consumer demand, endogenous product portfolios, and employment decisions. Applying the model to Whirlpool’s acquisition of Maytag in the appliance industry, I compare the observed merger to a counterfactual acquisition by a foreign buyer. Although Whirlpool’s acquisition decreased consumer welfare by $271 million annually, it preserved 797 domestic jobs. These jobs must therefore be valued at more than $344, 000 per year for the domestic employment benefits to offset the consumer harm. (JEL E24, F23, G34, J30, L13, L68, R23)

This paper examines the effects of privatizing social health insurance. We exploit a natural experiment in Medicaid, wherein nearly 100,000 enrollees were randomly assigned between a publicly operated fee-for-service system and private managed care. Managed care reduced costs by 5.6 percent via cost-effective substitutions among prescription drugs and via lower prices for outpatient services. We present evidence that pharmacy utilization management was the key mechanism reducing overuse and encouraging substitution to lower-cost drugs without decreasing observed quality. In contrast, privatizing medical benefits led to only modest savings and was associated with decreased health care quality and consumer satisfaction. (JEL G22, H41, I13, I18, I38)

Abstract Stock markets play a dual role: they provide information about firms’ fundamentals, which improves resource allocations, and they provide liquidity. We propose a setting in which these two roles interact: if stocks are used more intensively for liquidity, then prices reveal less information about fundamentals. We structurally estimate stock price informativeness for several countries and show that it declines when alternative liquidity sources, such as banks, are in distress. To study the real effects of this mechanism, we devise a strategy to integrate our stock-trading module into a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms. We calibrate the model to the United States and simulate recessions with and without banking distress. In a standalone recession, prices become more informative and allocation improves, mitigating output losses by 4.4%. If the recession coincides with banking distress, agents rely more on stock markets to obtain liquidity, prices become less informative, and allocation deteriorates, magnifying output losses by 22%.

Abstract Theory predicts that outsourcing public services to the private sector can reduce costs and improve efficiency but can also induce cost-cutting and compromise quality. We assess the Brazilian Organizações Sociais de Saude model (OSS), which outsources management of public hospital services to the private sector while the state remains the residual claimant. We show that this enhances hospital production and operational efficiency without adverse effects on hospital quality and equity. Increased inpatient production addresses previously unmet demand, expanding local access to hospital care and reducing population mortality. Performance gains arise from improved operational efficiency achieved through increased hospital management capacity. This facilitates staffing adjustments, favoring higher-skilled personnel, dismissing lower-productivity staff, and adopting flexible, performance-tied employment contracts. Effects are larger among private organizations with more management experience, underscoring returns to managerial capacity. Our findings show that incentive-ownership structures can address the quantity-quality trade-off in public service delivery, even when contracts are incomplete and quality is hard to measure.

Abstract How does proximity to coworkers affect training and productivity? We study software engineers at a Fortune 500 firm from 2019 to 2024, leveraging two shocks to proximity: the office closures in 2020 and the subsequent return-to-office mandates in 2022 and 2023. In both cases, co-located teams experienced bigger changes in proximity than distributed ones, facilitating difference-in-differences designs. We find that sitting near teammates increases coding feedback by 18.3% and improves code quality. Gains are concentrated among less-tenured and younger employees, who are building human capital. However, there is a trade-off: experienced engineers write less code when sitting near teammates. In national U.S. data, we find evidence that the rise of remote work has had scarring effects on young college graduates. In remotable jobs, young graduates’ unemployment rate increased relative to older graduates’ post-pandemic (2022–2024) compared to pre-pandemic (2017–2019), a pattern we do not observe in non-remotable jobs.

Abstract This article investigates how a government should manage international reserves when it faces the risk of a rollover crisis. We ask: Should the government accumulate reserves or reduce debt to make itself less vulnerable? We show that the optimal policy entails initially reducing debt, followed by a subsequent increase in both debt and reserves as the government approaches a safe zone. Furthermore, we find that issuing additional debt to accumulate reserves can lead to a reduction in sovereign spreads. Evidence from a panel of emerging economies is consistent with these predictions: increases in reserves financed by public external borrowing are associated with lower spreads, and reserve holdings are not systematically drawn down during crisis episodes.

Abstract We study rainmaking as an instrumental religious belief. We present a model in which a religious leader tries to persuade people to believe. Praying for rain can persuade only where the hazard of rainfall during a dry spell is increasing over time, so that prayer is most likely to succeed when people most want rain. We present evidence from prayers for rain in Murcia, Spain, where the hazard rate is increasing, that the church’s prayers for rain predict rainfall over two centuries. To generalize this finding, we gather an original data set of whether ethnic groups around the world traditionally prayed for rain. We find that ethnic groups facing an increasing rainfall hazard are 47% more likely to pray for rain, consistent with our model’s prediction that societies are more likely to pray for rain where prayer is persuasive.

Abstract This article examines how the American Medical Association (AMA) helped shape the development of the U.S. health insurance system in the critical period after World War II. Working with the political public relations firm Campaigns, Inc., the AMA launched a nationwide campaign to weaken support for national health insurance by framing it as “socialized medicine,” while simultaneously enrolling people in private health insurance plans to shift demand away from a public alternative. Drawing on newly assembled archival data, we find that greater exposure to the campaign explains about 20% of the rise in private health insurance enrollment and a comparable decline in public support for a national program. The campaign also appears to have influenced policy making through coordinated messaging, resolutions passed by civic organizations, congressional rhetoric, and political donations. These findings suggest that the rise of private health insurance in the United States was not solely due to macroeconomic forces or collective bargaining; rather, it was also enabled by a strategic, interest group–financed effort to shape citizen views and influence policy.

Abstract Since 1967, all French firms with more than 100 employees have been required to share a fraction of their excess profits with their employees. Through this scheme, firms with excess profits distribute, on average, 10.5% of their pretax income to workers. In 1990, the eligibility threshold was reduced to 50 employees. We exploit this regulatory change to identify the effects of mandated profit-sharing on firms and their employees. The cost of mandated profit-sharing for firms is evident in the significant bunching at the 100-employee threshold observed prior to the reform, which completely disappears post-reform. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that at the firm level, mandated profit-sharing (i) increases the labor share by 1.8 percentage points, (ii) reduces the profit share by 1.4 percentage points, and (iii) has small to nonexistent effects on investment and productivity. At the employee level, mandated profit-sharing increases lower-skilled workers’ total compensation and leaves high-skilled workers’ total compensation unchanged. Overall, mandated profit-sharing redistributes excess profits to lower-skilled workers in the firm without generating significant distortions or productivity effects.

Abstract Motivated by recent concerns surrounding the use of third-party pricing algorithms by competing firms, we study repeated Bertrand competition where market demand or the cost of serving the market is observed by an intermediary (or “algorithm”) that selectively discloses demand or cost information to maximize firms’ collusive profit. We show that an upper censorship disclosure policy is optimal, which leads to price rigidity and supra-monopoly prices in some states. Improving the algorithm’s accuracy reduces expected consumer surplus whenever it does so under monopoly pricing. When the state is positively correlated over time, the algorithm discloses more information when recent demand was lower or costs were higher. The analysis extends to a generalized model that accommodates product differentiation and capacity constraints. We relate our findings to recent antitrust cases.

Abstract This article examines the global adoption of technology in the late nineteenth century. We construct several novel data sets to test the idea that the codification of technical knowledge in the vernacular was necessary for countries to absorb the technologies of the first Industrial Revolution. We find that comparative advantage shifted to industries that could benefit from these technologies in countries and colonies with access to codified technical knowledge, but not in other regions. Using the rapid and unprecedented codification of technical knowledge in Meiji Japan as a natural experiment, we show that this pattern emerged only after the Japanese government codified vast amounts of technical knowledge. Our findings shed new light on the frictions associated with technological diffusion and offer a novel explanation for why Meiji Japan was unique among non-Western countries in successfully industrializing during the first wave of globalization.

Abstract We argue that the Democratic Party’s evolution on economic policy helps explain partisan realignment by education. First, we document that educated Americans differentially oppose “predistribution” (e.g., job guarantees, higher minimum wages, protectionism, and stronger unions), while the educational gradient for redistribution (taxes and transfers) is close to zero. These relationships have been largely unchanged since the 1940s. Second, focusing on politicians and donors as key party actors, we show that the Democratic Party has moved away from predistribution since the 1970s. The number of predistribution bills introduced by Democratic House Speakers has declined by half since the 1970s. Unions—the traditional lobbying force for predistribution—see their share of Democratic Party PAC donations decline from 90% to 40% from 1968 to 1980, following 1970s legislation that facilitated corporate PAC donations. From 1980 onward, the Democrats rely increasingly on individual contributions from educated donors relative to the Republicans. We show the increased reliance on corporate PACs and educated donors is driven by the rise of a self-described “New Democrat’’ faction particularly conservative on predistribution and social issues. Finally, we trace the reaction of voters to these changes in the Democratic Party. Less-educated Americans begin to leave the party in the 1970s, after decades of serving as its base. We also show that in the crucial transition period of the 1970s through 1990s, New Democrat candidates outperform other Democrats among more-educated voters in both survey questions and actual Congressional elections. As the New Democrats are more socially conservative than other Democrats, their success with educated voters suggests that social issues alone cannot explain educational realignment.

Abstract Do men negatively respond when women first enter an occupation? We answer this question by studying the end of one of the final explicit occupational barriers to women in the United States: in 2016, the U.S. military opened all positions to women, including historically male-only combat occupations. We exploit the staggered integration of women into combat units to estimate the causal effects of the introduction of female colleagues on men’s job performance, behavior, and perceptions of workplace quality, using monthly administrative personnel records and rich survey responses. We find that integrating women into previously all-male units does not negatively affect men’s performance or behavioral outcomes, including retention, promotions, demotions, separations for misconduct, criminal investigations, and medical conditions. Most of our results are precise enough to rule out small detrimental effects. However, there is a wedge between men’s perceptions and performance. The integration of women causes a negative shift in male soldiers’ perceptions of workplace quality. The decline is driven by units integrated with female officers, likely arising from female officers increasing men’s awareness of workplace problems or from men’s dissatisfaction from working with women in positions of authority—even though men in such units show some performance gains. If male-dominated workplaces are reluctant to incorporate women due to expectations that men will become less productive, our paper provides evidence to weigh against that notion.

Abstract We study technology sophistication using a novel approach that measures the sophistication of the most advanced (MAX) and the most widely used (MOST) technologies in key business functions within establishments. Using data from over 21,000 establishments across 15 countries, we find that establishments generally underutilize the most sophisticated technologies available in a business function. These MAX-MOST gaps are persistent and strongly associated with productivity both across establishments and countries. At the establishment level, there is substantial variation in both MAX and MOST, with MOST showing a more skewed distribution. MAX and MOST follow different life cycle patterns in low-income countries and among small establishments, and they exhibit different associations with several establishment characteristics and performance indicators. This evidence underscores the different nature of the technology upgrading processes that drive MAX and MOST.

Abstract Why do managers matter for firm performance? This article provides evidence of the critical role of managers in matching workers to jobs within the firm using the universe of personnel records from a large multinational firm. The data cover 200,000 white-collar workers and 30,000 managers over 11 years in 100 countries. I identify good managers by their speed of promotion and leverage exogenous variation induced by the rotation of managers across teams. I find that good managers cause workers to reallocate within the firm through lateral and vertical transfers and generate large and persistent gains in workers’ career progression and productivity. My results imply that the visible hands of managers match workers’ specific skills to specialized jobs, leading to an improvement in the productivity of existing workers that outlasts the managers’ time at the firm.

Abstract Women continue to be underrepresented in corporate leadership positions. This article studies the role of social connections in women’s career advancement. We investigate whether access to a larger share of female peers in business school affects the gender gap in senior managerial positions. Merging administrative data from a top 10 U.S. business school with public LinkedIn profiles, we first document that female MBAs are 24% less likely than male MBAs to enter senior management within 15 years of graduation. Next we use the exogenous assignment of students into sections to show that a larger proportion of female MBA section peers increases the likelihood of entering senior management for women but not for men. This effect is driven by female-friendly firms, such as those with more generous maternity leave policies and greater work-schedule flexibility. A larger proportion of female MBA peers induces women to transition to these firms where they attain senior management roles. A survey of female MBA alumnae reveals three key mechanisms: (i) information sharing, especially related to gender-specific advice, (ii) higher ambitions and self-confidence, and (iii) increasing support from male MBA peers. These findings highlight the role of social connections in reducing the gender gap in senior management positions.

Evidence from the laboratory and the field has uncovered both underreaction and overreaction to new information. We provide new experimental evidence on the underlying mechanisms of under‐ and overreaction by comparing how people make inferences and revise forecasts in the same information environment. Participants underreact to signals when inferring about underlying states, but overreact to the same signals when revising forecasts about future outcomes—a phenomenon we term “the inference‐forecast gap.” We show that this gap is largely driven by different simplifying heuristics used in the two tasks. Additional treatments suggest that the choice of heuristics is affected by the similarity between statistics in the information environment and the statistic elicited by the belief‐updating problem.

In sequential games, the set of paths consistent with rationality and forward‐induction reasoning may change nonmonotonically when adding transparent restrictions on players' beliefs. Yet, we prove that—in an incomplete‐information environment—predictions become sharper when the restrictions only concern initial beliefs about types. Thus, strong rationalizability for games with payoff uncertainty characterizes the path predictions of forward‐induction reasoning across all possible restrictions on players' hierarchies of exogenous beliefs. With this, we can solve an open problem: the implementation of social choice functions through sequential mechanisms under forward‐induction reasoning—which considerably expands the realm of implementable functions compared with simultaneous mechanisms (Müller (2016))—is indeed robust in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2009).

This paper explores the impact of information design on the auctioneer's revenue in the U.S. offshore oil/gas lease auctions where, post‐auction, the winner decides whether to explore the auctioned tract and must pay the government a royalty on its production value. I first document that there is a positive correlation between the exploration rate and publicly observed losing bids. This suggests that the winning bidder uses the rivals' bids to infer their private information about the tract's potential. I then characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy when the auctioneer designs and commits to how to reveal information on losing bids to the winning bidder. Counterfactual exercises reveal that alternative bid disclosure policies significantly improve auctioneer revenue.

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission deregulated campaign finance, enabling the rise of a new political action committee (the Super PAC) with broad freedom to raise and spend money. This led to an unprecedented surge in spending in primary and general elections. To evaluate the impact of Super PACs, I estimate a multistage model of political competition using data from U.S. Congressional elections between 2010 and 2020. I find that Super PAC spending by both sides prompts offsetting responses, resulting in limited net equilibrium effects. However, by amplifying the role of donors, Super PACs still have the potential to reshape the electoral landscape.

In the context of one‐to‐one matching markets, we study myopic‐farsighted stable sets , which are internally and externally stable when myopic agents consider immediate payoffs from their deviations, while farsighted agents anticipate counter‐deviations and consider final payoffs. We constructively prove the existence of a (rational expectations) myopic‐farsighted stable set, in which farsighted agents receive a single payoff while myopic agents may receive multiple payoffs. Our existence result extends to settings with enforcing coalitions of arbitrary size, yielding coalitional myopic‐farsighted stable sets , and to settings where not all members of an enforcing coalition must strictly gain, yielding myopic‐farsighted weakly stable sets . When all farsighted agents have unit demand, our results also extend to many‐to‐one matching markets. As a key corollary, we provide a foundation for the efficiency‐adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm by showing that its outcome constitutes a singleton myopic‐farsighted stable set when one side is farsighted and the other is myopic.

Apprenticeships play a key role in enabling successful school‐to‐work transitions in many countries, but in the presence of imperfect information, the specificity of this type of training may entail important costs for those working outside their training fields. I study this issue in one of the most prominent training settings, the German apprenticeship system. Using administrative data and a broad occupational classification, I find that 40% of individuals work in occupations different from their training. I estimate the cost of mismatch using vacancy instruments and extend methodological approaches in high‐dimensional selection settings. Lacking training in one's occupation entails an average wage penalty of 14%, the equivalent of two years of work experience. The penalty increases with the task distance between training and occupation. My findings suggest that retraining is crucial to mitigate the adverse consequences from imperfect information in specialized training settings.

Macroeconomic outcomes depend on the distribution of markups across firms and over time, making firm‐level markup estimates key for macroeconomic analysis. Methods to obtain these estimates require data on the prices that firms charge. Firm‐level data with wide coverage, however, primarily come from financial statements, which lack information on prices. We use an analytical framework to show that trends in markups over time or the dispersion of markups across firms can still be well‐measured with such data. Measuring the average level of the markup does require pricing data, and we propose a consistent estimator for such settings. We validate the analytical results using simulations of a quantitative macroeconomic model and offer supporting evidence from firm‐level administrative production and pricing data. Our analysis supports the use of financial data to measure trends in aggregate markups.

Tirole (1985) studied an overlapping generations model with capital accumulation and showed that the emergence of asset bubbles solves the capital over‐accumulation problem. His Proposition 1(c) claims that if the dividend growth rate is above the bubbleless interest rate (the steady‐state interest rate in the economy without the asset) but below the population growth rate, then bubbles are necessary in the sense that there exists no bubbleless equilibrium but there exists a unique bubbly equilibrium. We show that this result (as stated) is incorrect by presenting an example economy that satisfies all assumptions of Proposition 1(c) but its unique equilibrium is bubbleless. We also restore Proposition 1(c) under the additional assumptions that initial capital is sufficiently large and dividends are sufficiently small. We show through examples that these conditions are essential.

We consider a dynamic buyer–seller interaction. Instead of the buyer's valuation, it is the frequency with which he needs to trade that is the buyer's private information. The difference matters. With commitment, full surplus extraction is possible, for instance via limited‐time offers. Without commitment, ratcheting is mitigated, as not buying is not necessarily a sign of strength. Because time is informative, the seller learns and may adjust her behavior over time. When finding a suitable alternative seller is easy, she starts with a pooling offer before permanently switching to a screening offer. When finding a suitable alternative seller takes time, she starts with a pooling offer before occasionally experimenting with separating offers.

We derive a novel decomposition of the Gini coefficient into within‐ and between‐group inequality terms that sum to the aggregate Gini coefficient. This decomposition is derived from a set of axioms that ensure desirable behavior for the within‐ and between‐group inequality terms. The decomposition of the Gini coefficient is unique given our axioms, easy to compute, and can be interpreted geometrically.

This paper studies how the risk of hold‐up affects procurement. I use data on the universe of solar power auctions in India. The Indian context allows clean estimates of counterparty risk, because solar plants set up in the same states, by the same firms, are procured in auctions intermediated by either risky states themselves or the trusted central government. I find that the counterparty risk of an average state increases solar prices by 10%. This risk premium sharply reduces investment, because demand for green energy is elastic. Contract intermediation by the central government eliminates the counterparty risk premium.

Gaussian empirical Bayes methods usually maintain a precision independence assumption: The unknown parameters of interest are independent from the known standard errors of the estimates. This assumption is often theoretically questionable and empirically rejected. This paper proposes to model the conditional distribution of the parameter given the standard errors as a flexibly parameterized location‐scale family of distributions, leading to a family of methods that we call close . The close framework unifies and generalizes several proposals under precision dependence. We argue that the most flexible member of the close family is a minimalist and computationally efficient default for accounting for precision dependence. We analyze this method and show that it is competitive in terms of the regret of subsequent decision rules. Empirically, using close leads to sizable gains for selecting high‐mobility Census tracts.

Shrinkage methods are frequently used to improve the precision of least squares estimators of fixed effects. However, widely used shrinkage estimators guarantee improved precision only under strong distributional assumptions. I develop an estimator for the fixed effects that obtains the best possible mean squared error within a class of shrinkage estimators. This class includes conventional shrinkage estimators and the optimality does not require distributional assumptions. The estimator has an intuitive form and is easy to implement. Moreover, the fixed effects are allowed to vary with time and to be serially correlated, in which case the shrinkage optimally incorporates the underlying correlation structure. I also provide a method to forecast fixed effects one period ahead in this setting.